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ABSTRACT. Hume and Kant disagree about the motives involved in the 
performance of our duties to others. Hume thinks that natural virtues such as 
benevolence are best performed from “natural” motives, but that there are no 
natural motives for the performance of the “artificial” virtues, such as justice 
and fidelity to promises, which are performed from a sense of duty. Kant 
thinks all duties should be done from the motive of duty. In this paper, I 
examine the roots of the disagreement. If by a natural motive Hume means 
an intention that can be described without using normative concepts, Kant 
would deny that any adult human motives are “natural,” for all involve the 
thought that something is a reason. But Hume also seems to imply that being 
motivated  to  benevolence  and  self-interest  is  “natural”  in  some  way  that 
being motivated to keep our agreements  is not. I  trace this difference to 
differences  in  the  two  philosophers’  conceptions  of  action.  Hume’s  con- 
ception of action does not allow for genuinely shared action, while Kant’s 
does. For Kant, being motivated to keep our agreements is just as natural as 
being motivated to do others good. 
 
1. Introduction 
   
Hume and Kant notoriously disagree about the motives that 
are,  or  should  be,  involved  in  the  practice  of  our  duties  to  other 
people. Hume believes that a certain category of duties, those associ- 
ated with what he calls the “natural virtues,” are generally practiced 
from what he calls “natural motives” (T 3.2.1,478; T 3.2.6,531).
1 I 
am going to question this notion, but I will define it for now, as I 
think Hume does, as motives that we ordinarily have independently 
of morality. These motives do not involve moral thoughts, or desires 
whose  content  must  be  specified  in  terms  of  moral  or  normative 
concepts. So when we are moved by these desires, we are not trying 
to do our duty, or the right thing, or what is virtuous, or what is owed.  
Many of the natural virtues that Hume identifies, such as prudence, 
temperance, greatness of mind, cheerfulness, and so on, redound pri-   10 
marily to the benefit of the person who has them, but one of the most 
important natural virtues, benevolence, is a ground of our duty to be 
helpful and kind to others.
2 And Hume asserts that: 
 
Tho’  there  was  no  obligation  to  relieve  the  miserable,  our 
humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the 
immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we 
want the natural sentiments of humanity.  
(T 3.2.5,518) 
 
On the other hand, Hume believes  that  the duties  associated with 
what he calls the “artificial virtues” – most notably those of justice 
and fidelity to promises – are generally motivated by the sense of 
duty. Kant accepts two distinctions that each captures some features 
of Hume’s distinction between artificial and natural virtue – namely 
the  distinction  between  perfect  and  imperfect  duties,  and  the  dis- 
tinction  between  strict  and  broad  obligations.  But  Kant  of  course 
believes that all morally worthy actions  are done “from duty” (G 
4:397).
3  
  In this paper I argue that the ground of this disagreement is 
different than philosophers have traditionally supposed. On the sur- 
face, the disagreement appears to be a matter of substantive moral 
judgment: Hume admires the sort of person who rushes to the aid of 
another from motives of sympathy or humanity, while Kant thinks 
that a person who helps with the thought that it is his duty is the 
better character. While a moral disagreement of this kind certainly 
follows from their views, I will argue  that  the source of the dis- 
agreement lies elsewhere, namely in their different conceptions of 
action and motivation. This difference leads in turn to a surprisingly 
deep difference in their conceptions of our relation to other people, 
and  of  what  it  means  to  interact  with  other  people.  It  is  his 
conception  of  human  interaction  that  leads  Hume  to  think  that 
benevolence is natural while there is something artificial about our 
motives to act justly and to keep our promises. For Kant, on the other 
hand, no form of  adult human motivation is  “natural” in Hume’s 
sense – all adult human motivation involves the agent’s use of non-
natural  concepts  such  as  “law” or  “reason.”  But Kant’s theory of 
interaction grounds another sense in which it is just as “natural” to be 
motivated  to  keep  our  promises  and  agreements  as  it  is  to  be 
motivated to help each other out when we are in need.  
   11 
2. Natural and artificial virtue 
   
I  begin  by  laying  out  the  main  elements  of  Hume’s  dis- 
tinction between natural and artificial virtue, as I understand it. A 
natural virtue is grounded in our approval, that is, the moral sense’s 
approval, of some naturally occurring motive. Characteristically, a 
person who exhibits that virtue in action is directly motivated by the 
natural  motive  in  question.  For  instance,  as  we  have  seen,  Hume 
thinks  a  benevolent  person  is  motivated  by  his  “humanity”  –  by 
which Hume presumably means his desire to help others.
4 A person 
is motivated to do a naturally virtuous action by a sense of duty only 
if he lacks the natural motive, and hence the natural virtue itself. As 
Hume puts it: 
 
But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, 
without  any  other  motive?  I  answer,  It  may:  …  When  any 
virtuous  motive  or  principle  is  common  in  human  nature,  a 
person, who feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate 
himself upon that account, and may perform the action without 
the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by 
practice, that virtuous principle, or at least to disguise to himself, 
as much as possible, his want of it. (T 3.2.1,479) 
 
Importantly, this means that a person who actually has the natural 
virtue  need  not  be  aware  of,  or  especially  attentive  to,  the  moral 
character of her actions. She is not, or need not be, motivated by 
thoughts about what is obligatory or right. Therefore she does not, or 
at least does not necessarily, think of the helping action as owed to 
the other. 
  Hume’s discussion of the artificial virtues begins from his 
observation  that  there  are  no  natural  motives  for  performing  the 
actions  required  by  these  virtues.  For  example,  he  tells  us,  just 
actions are often contrary to the direct interests of those who perform 
them, the interests of the public, the interests of third parties, and 
even the interests of the person to whom they are owed (T 3.2.1,480-
482). So we  cannot appeal to self-interest or  to public or private 
benevolence  to  explain  what  motivates  us  to  perform  them.  But 
although  just  actions  may  not  be  useful  taken  one  at  a  time,  the 
system of justice is useful or even essential to the workings of society.  
Because of this, Hume thinks, we were originally motivated by self-
interest to support the establishment of a system of justice. And in a 
small society, we may also be motivated by self-interest to follow the   12 
rules of justice ourselves, both in order to contribute to the main- 
tenance of the system, and because if we were caught violating the 
rules of justice, others might not allow us to participate in the system 
and so to reap its benefits (T 3.2.2,499; T 3.2.4,533). Since the moral 
sense does not especially approve of self-interest, this is not a par- 
ticularly  virtuous  motive  (T  3.2.2,492).  But  as  society  grows  and 
becomes more complex, Hume tells us, we may “lose sight of that 
interest, which we have in maintaining order” when tempted by the 
profits  of  some  immediate  injustice.  Self-interest  will  no  longer 
sustain our commitment to justice. But even when some particular 
unjust act might be beneficial to us, according to Hume, “sympathy 
with public interest”  leads us  to disapprove of unjust  actions in  a 
general way (T 3.2.2,499-500). This leads us to disapprove of our- 
selves when we perform them. And that in turn leads us to avoid 
performing unjust actions, from the motive of duty. Thus in a larger 
society, the sense of duty becomes the usual motive for performing 
just actions. We do just actions with the sense that they are obli- 
gatory, motivated, according to Hume, by our “regard to justice, and 
abhorrence of villainy and knavery” (T 3.2.1,479).
5    
   
3.  Categories of duty 
   
Hume’s  distinction  between  natural  and  artificial  virtue 
maps roughly on to the traditional distinction between imperfect and 
perfect  duties  or  rights.  This  distinction  came  into  modern  philo- 
sophy from the Roman Law tradition by way of the work of Hugo 
Grotius.
6 Although the distinction has been drawn in different ways, 
generally  speaking  it  goes  something  like  this:  when  you  have  a 
perfect duty you owe some particular action or omission  to some 
particular other person (perhaps to every other person). When you 
have an imperfect duty, there is some general kind of action you are 
supposed to perform, but you have  leeway about exactly  what or 
how  much  you  do,  to  whom,  and  on  what  occasions.  You  are 
criticized if you fail to perform your perfect duties, but not ordinarily 
praised for doing them. You are, however, praised for fulfilling the 
imperfect duties, especially if you do so to an extraordinary degree – 
although views differ about what exactly this means.
7 Traditionally, 
the duties of justice are placed in the category of perfect duties, and 
the duties of benevolence and charity are placed in the category of 
imperfect duties. Duties of  justice  are owed  to particular  persons,   13 
who are the possessors of corresponding rights; offerings of charity 
cannot be claimed as a right by any individual, even though each of 
us  has  some  obligation  to  practice  charity.  Claims  of  justice  are 
upheld by law, while charity is a private matter. We are praised for 
charity but not for compliance with laws and contracts – rather, we 
are criticized if we fail to comply with them.   
  Kant takes this distinction over from the tradition, but com- 
plicates  it with  an additional distinction, between strict  and broad 
duties.
8 Strict duties are directly required actions; broad duties are 
duties to have certain maxims or ends. Strict duties are all perfect, 
and  may  be  legally  enforced.  The  requirement  to  have  a  certain 
maxim  or  end  may  find  expression  in  either  perfect  or  imperfect 
duties, depending on whether the performance of a particular action 
is absolutely required by the end or merely one of many possible 
ways of promoting it. In Kant’s philosophy, the duties of justice and 
fidelity to promises are strict and perfect duties, while the duty of 
beneficence is broad and, except perhaps in certain emergency cir- 
cumstances, normally imperfect – there are many ways we can help 
others, among which we may choose.    
  These distinctions have some intuitive force. Many people 
think that there is some difference between the duties of justice and 
charity of roughly the sort I have described. And many people would 
also  associate  it  with  a  motivational  difference  of  the  sort  Hume 
associates with the natural/artificial distinction: the right or at least 
best way to perform charitable acts is from motives of benevolence 
and humanity, while just acts must be performed from the sense that 
they are owed. A familiar objection to Kant’s notorious sympathy 
example in the first section of the Groundwork is that someone who 
does an act of charity or friendship from a sense of duty is inferior to 
someone who does it from motives of natural sympathy or humanity 
(G  4:398-399).
9  On  the  other  hand,  someone  who  pays  his  debts 
from humanitarian motives seems to be missing an important point – 
paying your debts is not just a way of being kind to people.     
  These  familiar  ideas  posed  a  problem  for  the  rationalists 
and  sentimentalists  of  the  eighteenth  century.  According  to  tradi- 
tional  rationalist  views  like  those  of  Samuel  Clarke  and  Richard 
Price, rightness or requiredness is a property of actions, and when we 
recognize that property we are motivated to do them by that fact, and 
so by the motive of duty.
10 This makes it seem as if all duties are 
strict or perfect and the motive for performing them is always the   14 
motive of duty, and that gives rise to a puzzle about the status of 
charitable or benevolent  actions. For  if  every  action either has or 
lacks the essential property of requiredness, it is not clear how we 
are  to  make  room  for  the  leeway  we  supposedly  have  about  the 
amount of charity we practice and the particular occasions on which 
we choose to practice it. It seems as if we have only two options:  
either the action is required and so obligatory, in which case it we 
have no leeway about whether to do it, or it is not required, in which 
case there is nothing morally good about performing it.
11  
  On  the  other  hand,  sentimentalist  views  like  Francis 
Hutcheson’s, according to which justice is the practice of “universal 
calm bene- volence,” leave it a mystery why any action should be 
regarded as obligatory or owed rather than merely as better or worse, 
kinder  or  less  kind.
12  Some  contemporary  utilitarians  have 
acknowledged this implication of utilitarian accounts of rightness.
13 
Hutcheson, who thought of the motive of duty in much the same way 
Hume does, even suggests that people who act from duty are self-
interested,  since  they  are  trying  to  achieve  the  pleasure  of  self-
approval.
14  Hutcheson  himself  ends  up  recommending  that  we 
jettison “ought” as a “confused word,” which really refers only to 
justifying and not to motivating reasons. In other words, to say that 
someone ought to do something is only to say that we approve of his 
doing  it,  not  to  mention  a  possible  motive.
15  Hume’s  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  artificial  virtues  is  a  brilliant  attempt  to 
solve this problem, by making a place for something like strict of 
perfect duties – duties that are rigorous, owed, and done from the 
motive of duty – within a sentimentalist framework. 
   
4.  Motivation and the artificial virtues 
   
But I want to raise a question about Hume’s account of the 
artificial virtues. What exactly does Hume mean to deny when he 
denies  that  there  is  a  natural  motive  to,  say,  repaying  loans  or 
keeping promises? In setting up his argument, Hume offers us the 
following case: 
 
I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition 
that it be restor’d in a few days; and also suppose, that after the 
expiration of the term agreed on, he demands the sum:  I ask, 
What reason or motive have I to restore the money? (T 3.2.1,479)   15 
 
Hume goes on to say that when human beings are in a “rude and 
natural  state,”  the  answer  cannot  be  “my  regard  to  justice,  and 
abhorrence of villainy and knavery” (T 3.2.1,479). For, he says, “one 
in that situation would ask you, Wherein consists this honesty and 
justice, which you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from the 
property of others?” (T 3.2.1,480). Now it seems initially plausible 
to suppose that by “in a rude and natural state” Hume means “prior 
to  the  institution  of  justice  and  property,”  since  he  proceeds  to 
explain how the institution of property arises. Then his point seems 
to be that motives like “because it is just” or “because I promised” 
cannot  exist  in  that  state,  since  they  depend  on  institutions  and 
conventions that do not yet exist. But if that is what he means, then 
he has set up his example very badly. For if a person has lent me 
money, then there must already be an institution of property, and a 
convention of lending, which in turn depends upon a convention of 
promising, all in place. On the other hand, until the institutions of 
justice and promising are established, there are no actions that can be 
described as “repaying a loan” or “keeping a promise,” so of course 
there can be no motives for doing these things. So what is Hume 
denying,  when  he  denies  that  there  are  natural  motives  for  just 
actions? 
  Perhaps what Hume has in mind is that we can describe the 
very same actions that we do once the institutions of justice exist, but 
in naturalistic terms that do not make any reference to the institutions 
of justice. And when we think of just actions under these alternative 
descriptions, then we can see no natural motives for performing them.  
At one point Hume himself seems to suggest this interpretation, for 
he suggests that the naturalistic description of one just action – the 
return of property to its owner – is roughly “to restore objects to 
those who have had first or long possession of  them, or  have re- 
ceived  them  by  the  consent  of  those  who  have  had  first  or  long 
possession of them” (T 3.2.6,528). Hume says that the moral sense 
does not naturally approve of this, and that this shows that justice is 
not  a  natural  virtue.  So  perhaps  Hume  thinks  there  is  no  natural 
motive  to  just  actions when  those actions are  thus naturalistically 
described.  But  there is a difficulty here, for  the description of an 
action either includes the agent’s intention, or it does not, and there 
are problems either way.     16 
  If the description of the action includes its intention, then 
one may object that Hume has not produced a naturalistic description 
of the same action, since returning the object to the person who first 
acquired it or his successors, is not, or rather is only incidentally, 
what the person who returns property to its owner intends to do. As 
Hume  himself  is  eager  to  emphasize,  the  exact  conventions  that 
determine property are extremely arbitrary, and seem to be based as 
much  on  dim  psychological  associations  as  anything  else  (T 
3.2.3,501-513).  If  the  conventions  that  determine  property  were 
different,  the  just  person  would  not  return  things  to  their  first 
possessor  or  his  successors  –  his  intention  is  to  do  what  justice 
requires, not to return things to their first possessor. More generally, 
if the description of an action includes  the agent’s  intention, then 
there cannot be a wholly naturalistic description of a just action, for 
it is  essential to a  just action  that it be done with  intentions that 
cannot be specified without appeal to concepts like “property” “pro- 
mise” “justice” or “right.” If we assume that what renders a motive 
“non-natural” is that it cannot be described without reference to these 
normative concepts, then the motives of just actions must be non-
natural.
16  
  On the other hand, Hume might only mean that the moral 
sense does not approve of the mere outward act of returning things to 
their first possessor or his successor, leaving the agent’s intention 
aside. But that would not give him a way to distinguish between the 
natural and artificial virtues, since as Hume himself emphasizes, the 
moral sense never approves of mere outward acts (T 3.2.1,477). A 
wholly external description of a benevolent action, if that would be 
one that made no reference to the benevolent desires of its performer 
or the neediness of its object, would offer as little for the moral sense 
to approve of as a wholly external description of a just action does.  
For consider a parallel. The conventions of justice happen to single 
out the first possessor or his successors as the owner of property.  
Well, suppose that the criterion of neediness happens to single out 
“George.”  If  I  describe  my  benevolent  action  simply  as  “giving 
money to George” then I have no natural motive to perform it. His 
being “George” is certainly no reason to give him money. So what is 
the difference here?   
  Now it may be objected that I am being petty in focusing so 
much on the way Hume has set up his example. Okay, so we can 
concede that Hume has constructed his example badly. His point (the   17 
objector will say) is just that there is no such thing as a just action, 
and no naturalistically describable  item  that corresponds to a  just 
action,  prior  to  the  invention  of  the  institutions  of  justice.  But 
naturally virtuous actions can be described naturalistically, simply as 
enactments of the desire  to help,  and when we do describe  them 
naturalistically we approve of them without further ado.  Hume is 
only telling us that the motives to justice and fidelity to promises 
came into being along with the institutions of justice and promises 
themselves.  So says the objector. 
  But actually Hume does mean more than this. To see this, 
consider that there are two different questions we might be asking 
when we ask for the motive for, say, keeping a promise. Suppose 
you see me giving a book to someone, and you ask me why I am 
doing that.  I might say I am doing it because I promised that I would 
give  it  to  him.  Essentially  what  I  have  done  is  take  an  action 
described  intentionally  but  naturalistically  –  giving  a  book  to  a 
certain person – and redescribed it in an obviously normative way – 
as the keeping of a promise. But if what you ask is why I am going 
to keep my promise, or why in general I keep my promises, you are 
asking  a  different  question  –  a  question  that,  in  ordinary  circum- 
stances, most of us would find a little peculiar. Most of us believe 
that “I promised” is a sufficient answer, because it is a decisive and 
sufficient reason; one hardly needs a further reason for keeping a 
promise. But Hume does think that there is a kind of further reason, 
namely, that the moral sense disapproves of those who do not keep 
their promises, and that we will therefore be guilty of villainy and 
knavery if we do not keep ours.
17 This shows up  in  the  fact that 
Hume  runs  the  two  questions  –  “why  are  you  giving  that  person 
money?” and “why do you repay loans” – or rather the answers to 
these two questions, together. For instance at the beginning of the 
discussion  of  the  artificial  virtues,  continuing  a  passage  I  quoted 
earlier, he says: 
 
I ask, What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will, 
perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of 
villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the 
least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation.  
(T 3.2.1,479) 
 
Notice the way Hume throws together, without comment, “my re- 
gard  for  justice”  and  “my  abhorrence  of  villainy  and  knavery.”    18 
Actually, there is room for a difference between saying that I am 
motivated by the thought “it was a loan” – that is, by my regard for 
justice – and saying that I am motivated by the thought “I will be a 
knave  if  I  do  not  return  a  loan”  –  that  is,  by  my  abhorrence  for 
villainy and knavery. If “my regard for justice” means my regard for 
the requirements of justice, the thought that “it was a loan” might 
seem to be enough of a motive, without the further thought that only 
knaves disregard justice. Hume sounds as if he thinks that these two 
motives  are  inseparable,  that  is,  that  a  regard  for  justice  cannot 
motivate  us  directly,  without  the  mediation  of  an  abhorrence  of 
villainy and knavery, an abhorrence that comes from the moral sense. 
  And of course that is what he thinks. You might be tempted 
to protest that the reason you will be a knave if you do not repay a 
loan is that a non-knavish person would be sufficiently motivated to 
repay a loan by the fact that it was a loan, or by a desire to repay his 
loans. The moral sense tells us that people who lack these motives 
are knaves. But now Hume will reply that this isn’t right, and this is 
just his point, and that this, after all, is what he means by calling the 
virtue artificial. My judgment that I will be a knave if I don’t repay 
loans is not based on a judgment that there is a certain natural way of 
being motivated – say, by the desire to return loans – of which the 
moral sense  approves. The moral sense does disapprove  of unjust 
actions, but not because they show the want of some natural motive 
– rather, because they are contrary to the public interest once the 
system is set up. Therefore the only possible motive for performing 
them springs from that disapproval itself.  
  That is Hume’s view. The point I am making in response to 
it here  is  that  there  appears  to be conceptual space for  a kind of 
motivation  that stands between Hume’s own  categories of natural 
and artificial motivation. For Hume’s argument in fact trades on two 
slightly different senses of non-natural: motives can be non-natural 
in  the  sense  that  they  cannot  be  described  without  reference  to 
normative notions such as justice and property, or they can be non-
natural in the sense that they are dependent on the moral sense. And 
it is conceptually possible to tease these two senses apart. We could 
hold  that  once  justice  and  promises  exist,  people  have  desires  to 
conform to them: desires to do what justice requires and to keep our 
promises. These desires, if they existed, would be non-natural in the 
sense that they would only be describable in terms of concepts drawn 
from the conventions of justice and promising, but they might still be   19 
natural in the sense that they could motivate us independently of the 
moral sense. If there were any such desires, the moral sense would 
certainly approve them. But in that case we would not always do just 
actions from the motive of duty, as Hume understands it. Rather, one 
would be motivated to act justly by the sense of duty only if one 
lacked  the  natural  desire  to  conform  to  justice  and  keep  one’s 
promises, just as one is motivated to act benevolently by the sense of 
duty only if one lacks the natural desire to help. It is clear that this 
possibility is not on the table for Hume, so it must be that Hume 
thinks that even once the artifice of justice is established, there are 
no such desires. That is, Hume must think that we cannot be moti- 
vated by the desire to return loans or keep promises independently of 
thoughts  about  how  knavish  we  would  be  if  we  don’t.  Whereas 
Hume thinks we can be motivated to help people without having any 
thoughts at all about how knavish we will be if we don’t – for we 
might just naturally want to help.  
  This  actually  fits  what  Hume  says  when  he  sets  up  his 
argument.  He  imagines  that  the  institution  has  been  established, 
since, as he describes the case, his protagonist has been given a loan, 
but has no natural motive for returning it. So Hume has not, after all, 
set  his  example  up  in  a  clumsy  way,  but  said  exactly  what  he 
meant.
18 But we have cleared Hume of the charge of setting up his 
case in a clumsy way at a cost. Hume’s reason for ruling out the 
desire to keep promises and repay loans as impossible “in a rude and 
natural  state”  is not, we now see,  that  they must be described  in 
concepts drawn from institutions and conventions that do not exist in 
a rude and natural state. Rather, Hume thinks that we cannot have 
desires to keep promises or return loans (independently of thoughts 
about our knavishness if we lack them) even once the institutions 
exist.  But  now  it  is  no  longer  clear  that  Hume  has  given  us  any 
reason to believe that  considerations  like “I promised” or “It was 
only a loan” cannot motivate us directly. Or rather, the only reason 
he has given us is that the desire to return a loan and the desire to 
keep a promise are not forms of benevolence or self-interest.   
  But  couldn’t  there  be  natural  motives  other  than  bene- 
volence or self-interest for following the rules of justice? Now you 
may  object  that  we  cannot  create  natural  motives  to  follow  rules 
simply by making those rules. Our original motive for making the 
rules of justice was self-interest, but as Hume has pointed out, self-
interest  cannot  explain  why  we  follow  the  rules  when  confronted   20 
with the temptations of free-ridership. So we need some explanation 
of  how  people  are  motivated  to  follow  the  rules  even  in  these 
circumstances, and that is why Hume moves to the explanation in 
terms of the moral sense: he thinks we are motivated by the prospect 
of self-disapproval. But there is an important assumption behind this 
sort of argument: namely, that people are not naturally motivated to 
keep agreements. For once the institutions of justice and promising 
exist, promises, loans, and transfers of property, are in fact just forms 
of agreement. This is especially obvious in the case of a promise, 
which may be regarded simply as a rather solemn form of agreement. 
And  there  are  some  philosophers,  Hume  himself  arguably  among 
them, who think the establishment of the institution of property itself 
is  a  kind  of  agreement.
19  Perhaps  it  is  not  surprising  that  philo- 
sophers  who  assume  that  all  motivation  is  self-interested  cannot 
imagine how we could be motivated to keep an agreement, but Hume 
does not assume that, since he assumes that we are capable of natural 
benevolence. So I can put my question this way. Why couldn’t we be 
naturally motivated by a desire to keep our agreements with other 
people in just the same way as we can be naturally motivated by the 
desire  to  do  them  some  good?
20  According  to  Hume,  people  are 
naturally related to each other only by benevolence or its absence.  
What conception of human relationships, we might ask, is behind 
this conviction? 
 
5. Kant on the nature of action and the motive of duty
   
  I have been raising the possibility that once the institutions 
of justice and promising exist, we might have natural motives for 
keeping  promises  and  repaying  loans  and  the  like.  We  might  be 
naturally  motivated  to  keep  our  agreements.  This  suggests  that  I 
think Hume’s artificial virtues could be constructed in a way that 
makes them look more like his natural virtues. This may seem like a 
surprising line of argument coming from a Kantian, who thinks all 
morally good actions are done from duty. You would expect me to 
argue that Hume’s natural virtues should be more like his artificial 
ones, rather than the reverse. And in one sense you’d be right. To 
make things clearer, I will now suggest a way of thinking about the 
comparison between Hume and Kant, one that becomes available to 
us once we separate the two versions of the motive to artificial virtue 
that  I  have  distinguished:  namely,  “because  it  was  a  loan”  and   21 
“because I will be a knave if I do not return a loan.” In order to 
explain what I have in mind, I must explain how I understand Kant’s 
view of what is rather misleadingly called “the motive of duty,” and 
in  particular  how  I  think  it  arises  directly  from  his  concepts  of 
motivation and action. So now we must take a brief excursus into the 
philosophy of action. 
  Kant thinks that the motivation to any action involves two 
factors, an incentive and a principle or maxim. (I’m using “incen- 
tive” here for the variously translated “triebfeder.”
21) As I understand 
it, on Kant’s view an incentive is a motivationally-loaded or eva- 
luative  representation  of  an  object.  I  am  using  the  term  “object” 
broadly here to include not only substances but also states of affairs 
and  activities.  The  object  may  be  something  perceived,  or  just 
conceived as an attractive possibility. You are subject to an incentive 
when you are aware of the features of some object that make the 
object attractive or appealing to you. Perhaps the object satisfies one 
of  your  needs;  or  perhaps  because  of  human  nature  or  your  own 
particular nature the object is one you are capable of enjoying. It 
interests you, it arouses the exercise of your faculties, it excites your 
natural curiosity, or it provides some sort of emotional comfort or 
satisfaction. It doesn’t matter  what – something  about you makes 
you conceive this object as appealing or welcome in a particular way.  
Incentives  can  also  be  negative.  You  may  represent  an  object  to 
yourself as painful or threatening or disgusting, or in some other way 
unwelcome.
22 The incentive is what presents a certain possible action 
to  the  mind  as  eligible.  We  can  say  loosely  that  desires  and  in- 
clinations  are  incentives,  and  I  will  do  so  here,  to  facilitate  the 
comparison with Hume, but the more correct thing to say is this: to 
attribute an occurrent desire to someone is to record the fact that he 
is under the influence of an incentive.
23   
  Now  here  is  where  the  main  difference  between  Hume’s 
and Kant’s accounts of action comes in. Hume thinks that actions are 
essentially movements that are caused by our desires, or, in Kant’s 
language, incentives.
24 To be motivated is essentially to be caused to 
move by a desire (in light of your beliefs). Kant thinks that desires 
and other incentives operate on us causally but do not directly cause 
our movements. If they did, the movements would not be actions. A 
desire for food, after all, can cause you to salivate. If it also could 
cause you to go to the refrigerator, then salivating and going to the 
refrigerator would equally be actions. Action, according to Kant, is   22 
the  determination  of  our  own  causality,  so  if  we  are  to  count  a 
movement as an action, the movement must be determined by the 
agent herself, not merely caused by her desires. In other words, an 
agent must act on the incentive, must take it up as a reason for action, 
by adopting a maxim or subjective principle of acting on it. So every 
action must involve both an incentive and a principle: that is, some- 
thing is presented to the agent’s consciousness, on which the agent 
then  acts.  To  the  extent  that  the  person  determines  himself  to 
intentional  movement,  he  takes  his  desire  to  provide  him  with  a 
reason for his action; and that is not the same as its directly causing 
his action. To be motivated is to be moved by the thought that some 
incentive provides you with a reason to act.
 25,26  
  Since action is the determination of our own causality, on 
Kant’s account, to deliberate is to ask whether a maxim formulated 
in  response  to  some  incentive  can  serve  as  law  by  which  I  may 
determine my own causality. One criterion for such a law is that the 
act I propose to do will in fact enable me to cause the end I propose 
to  bring  about.  This  gives  us  what  Kant  calls  the  hypothetical 
imperative or principle of instrumental reason. But is not enough for 
Kant’s concept of action to ask whether my maxim can serve as a 
hypothetical imperative, a law correctly connecting a means to an 
end. A hypothetical imperative can determine my movements only if 
I am inevitably determined to move by the end. And if I have no 
choice about whether to pursue the end, if I am bound to the end by 
the bare fact that I have a desire for it, then my movements are not 
self-determined – they are ultimately determined by the end. This is 
indeed how Hume conceives of acting for an instrumental reason.  
For  Hume,  the  belief  that  a  certain  action  will  promote  my  end 
serves as a kind of conduit by which motive force travels from my 
desire for the end to the thought of taking means, creating a desire to 
take the means.
27 But Kant thinks that I am only self-determining if I 
also determine myself to adopt the end. In other words, I am only 
self-determining if I adopt the entire maxim as a law determining my 
causality. So I must ask whether the entire maxim is fit to serve as a 
law,  that  is,  whether  pursuing  this  sort  of  ends  by  these  sorts  of 
means can serve as a law. In other words I must ask whether my 
maxim is in accordance with the categorical imperative, which says 
to adopt those maxims that have the form of laws.
28 
  To  avoid  confusion,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
there are two ways in which a maxim can be said to qualify to be a   23 
universal law. In some cases, when we test a maxim by the cate- 
gorical imperative, we find that it can serve as a law. In that case, the 
action is permissible. Notice that in this case the incentive we act 
upon is natural, although the principle under which we act is still 
ultimately the categorical imperative. In other cases, when we test a 
maxim, we find that it cannot serve as a law. In this kind of case, we 
conclude that the maxim of doing the opposite action must be a law, 
and now we have a duty. For instance, if you are tempted to break a 
promise, test the maxim, and find it rejected, then it is your duty to 
keep your promise.  
  Kant thinks that in this kind of case, we are motivated to 
keep the promise. But if a motive always involves both an incentive 
and  a  principle,  what  in  this  case  is  the  incentive?  That  is,  what 
presents the action to the mind as an eligible thing to do? Kant’s 
answer is that the incentive is what he calls “respect for law.” To be 
motivated  by  respect  for  law  is  to  be  motivated  to  do  something 
directly by the thought that the maxim of doing it has the force of 
law, in the sense that it must be a law. In other words, the categorical 
imperative itself generates an incentive for doing what it says we 
must do. When we act on this incentive we are said to act “from 
duty.” And when Kant tells us that pure reason can be practical, this 
is the fact he is referring to – the fact that the principle of pure reason 
can generate an incentive of its own.  
  Of course Kant does not mean to suggest that we act from 
moral incentives only in cases where we are tempted to do the wrong 
thing. There is no reason to doubt that as we come to know what sort 
of  things  the  moral  law  requires  of  us,  we  will  develop  a  set  of 
standing moral incentives. And this will include considerations like 
“I promised” and “it was a loan.” The motivational force of such 
considerations depends on the categorical imperative, in the sense 
that when we act on them we are moved by respect for law.   
 
6.  Kant and Hume on the motive of duty 
   
Now for the comparison. In one way, we can now see that 
Kant’s account closely parallels Hume’s account of the operation of 
the motive of duty, at least in the case of the artificial virtues. In 
Hume’s  account,  considerations  like  “I  promised”  and  “it  was  a 
loan,” or the corresponding desires, get their motivational force from 
the fact that the moral sense declares that we are knaves if we are not   24 
moved by them. In a similar way, in Kant’s account, considerations 
like “I promised” and “it was a loan” get their motivational force 
from  the  fact  that  the  categorical  imperative  declares  such  consi- 
derations  to  have  the  force  of  law.  In  the  case  of  these  kinds  of 
considerations, according to both philosophers, motivational force is 
derived from normative force, rather than the reverse. That’s what 
the two views have in common. It is in this sense, ultimately, that the 
motivation involved in acting from duty is not natural – it is moti- 
vation that is normative in origin, motivation produced by normative 
thoughts.   
  In  another  way,  though,  the  two  accounts  are  different, 
because the relation between the general moral principle or faculty 
and the particular considerations that get their motive force from it is 
different. In Kant’s account, the categorical imperative tells us that 
certain maxims have the force of law, and have it by virtue of their 
form. This is supposed to show us that the reasons expressed in those 
maxims are to be treated as final and sufficient reasons because they 
have that form. Respect for law provides a motive for doing them, 
because they are laws. So it is not that you have an extrinsic purpose 
– that of doing your duty – and the categorical imperative tells you 
that performing these actions is a means to doing your duty. It tells 
you that performing certain actions and adopting certain ends is your 
duty. Because  the maxims of these  actions have the form of law, 
respect for law is an intrinsic motive for doing them.
29 It is important 
to emphasize this, because the usual criticisms of acting from duty, 
especially in the case of helping people, are based on the idea that 
your real purpose must either be to help the other person or to do 
your duty. But in fact, what the categorical imperative tells you is 
that your duty  is to  make helping  the other person  your purpose. 
Similarly, when you keep a promise, it is not because you have some 
further  purpose  –  doing  your  duty  –  that  keeping  your  promises 
serves. Your duty  is  to keep your promise for  its own sake. The 
categorical  imperative  tells  you  that  a  consideration  like  “I  pro- 
mised” is itself to be treated as a reason with the force of law, an 
unconditional reason.  
  And it is not clear that Hume can agree with this, or anyway 
that he does. Consider again his description of the operation of the 
moral motive in the case of the natural virtues: 
  
When  any  virtuous  motive  or  principle  is  common  in  human 
nature,  a person, who feels his heart devoid of  that principle,   25 
may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action 
without  the  motive,  from  a  certain  sense  of  duty,  in  order  to 
acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least to disguise 
to himself, as much as possible, his want of it. (T 3.2.1,479) 
 
Here it seems clear that Hume is not thinking that the moral sense 
transforms the consideration that someone needs help into a final and 
sufficient reason for action. It is more that your desire to avoid self-
hatred  or  self-disapproval  gives  you  an  instrumental  reason  for 
helping others. You help people in order to avoid self-hatred or self-
disapproval. As Hume’s predecessor, Hutcheson, had pointed out, it 
appears as if acting on the motive of duty so conceived is a form of 
self-interested motivation.  
  On Hume’s theory, do we act justly only to avoid our own 
disapproval? The question seems to leave Hume with a dilemma. On the 
one hand, Hume might just accept this implication: even the just person 
never keeps a promise or returns a loan for its own sake, but as a means 
of avoiding self-disapproval. On the other hand, he may deny that, and 
say that the moral sense tells us that considerations like “I promised” and 
“it  was  a  loan”  are  themselves,  all  by  themselves,  to  be  treated  as 
reasons for action, and not just as a means of avoiding self-hatred. But 
then it is not clear why the moral sense shouldn’t also tell us that “he 
needs help” is to be treated as a reason for action, irrespective of whether 
I have a desire to help him, and not just as a means of avoiding self-
hatred. If Hume chooses the second alternative, there would be little 
difference  between  Hume  and  Kant,  since  he  would  in  effect  be 
adopting  the  view  that  the  moral  sense  is  not  merely  a  faculty  of 
approval and disapproval, but a practical faculty capable of giving rise to 
reasons through its own legislation. That is, he would have transformed 
the Humean moral sense into the Kantian will.
30   
  But now I want to approach the question from the other side. 
So let’s ask more directly why Kant draws a different conclusion 
about the duties of beneficence than Hume does. Why is it better if 
we do them from moral motives? We have seen that Hume thinks an 
artificial  motive  is  one  whose  motivational  force  depends  on  its 
normative force. Once  that is  in place,  it  is  clear  that part of  the 
answer is that Kant thinks that, in adult human beings, motivational 
force is always derived from normative force, in the following sense:  
incentives do not motivate us, unless we decide they have the status 
of reasons, that is, unless we adopt the maxims of acting on them as 
laws. But that is only part of the answer, because what I have just   26 
said  applies  to  permissible  actions  as  much  as  to  required  ones.  
When we decide that a maxim can serve as a law – not that it must, 
but that it can – we are deciding that a certain natural incentive can 
count as a reason to perform a certain action. So although in Kant’s 
theory there is a sense in which motivational force always follows 
from  normative  judgment,  it  does  not  follow  that  every  action  is 
done from the incentive of duty: permissible actions are still done 
from natural incentives. And there is a further reason why Kant de- 
nies moral worth to benevolent actions done from natural incentives.   
  Earlier I said that we can distinguish two senses in which 
you  might  ask  me  why  I  am  keeping  a  promise  –  that  is,  doing 
something that is in fact keeping a promise. You might ask me why I 
am giving someone a book, and I could say “because I promised,” 
thus offering a normative redescription of the action. Or you might 
ask me why I keep my promises – in effect asking me why I treat “I 
promised” as a reason. We have now seen that Kant’s answer to this 
second question – why I keep my promises – is that the moral law 
tells us that promises must be regarded as laws. In a similar way in 
the case of a beneficent action we might ask, “why are you giving 
that man a life raft?” to which the answer is “in order to help him” or 
we might ask “why do you help people?” Now if Hume is proposing 
that the virtuous person’s answer to this second question is “because 
I  want  to”  then  we  have  reached  the  exact  moment  where  the 
argument  of  the  first  section  of  Kant’s  Groundwork  begins.  For 
while Kant agrees with Hume that people who want to help others 
for its own sake are amiable and admirable, he  also believes that 
someone who adopts a maxim of helping others merely because he 
wants to help them or likes to help them does not yet display moral 
worth.
31  As  I  have  argued  elsewhere,  Kant’s  criticism  of  the  na- 
turally sympathetic person is not that he wants to help others only 
because it pleases him to do so. The trouble is that he chooses to help 
others only because he wants to. And this means that he has not yet 
grasped the deepest reason why we should help people. Since the 
categorical imperative dictates that we must help each other, people 
have a claim on our help that is independent of our desires. That 
reason –  that others have a  claim on your help – is no  more na- 
turalistically describable than thoughts about justice or promising.  
And beside that reason, any natural desire you have to help people 
becomes irrelevant, in just the same way that your desire to enrich 
someone would be irrelevant if you owed him the money.
32    27 
 
7.  Interaction and motives of agreement 
   
I left off my discussion of Hume with  the question why 
Hume couldn’t grant that, once the institutions of justice and pro- 
mising exist, we can have motives for respecting property rights and 
keeping  promises  that  are  natural  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not 
depend on the moral sense. In particular, since promises, loans, and 
many  property  transactions,  are  simply  forms  of  agreement,  why 
can’t  we be motivated directly by the fact that we have  made  an 
agreement, without drawing motivation from the further thought that 
those  who  don’t  respect  property  rights  and  keep  promises  –  or 
perhaps, who don’t keep agreements – are knaves?  I hope it is now 
clear that in one sense I think Hume is right about this question and 
in another he is wrong. I think that Hume is right to deny that our 
motives  for  keeping  promises  and  repaying  loans  are  natural  and 
exist  independently  of  morality.  According  to  Kant’s  account  of 
motivation, no form of motivation (or  at  least  adult human moti- 
vation) is natural in Hume’s sense, for motivation always involves 
drawing a normative conclusion: at least that your maxim can be a 
law.
33 And the motivation for justice and promise-keeping is non-
natural in a further sense, for in these cases the incentive is derived 
from the categorical imperative itself: that is, it is respect for law.  
But in Kant’s account the derivation of motivation from the cate- 
gorical  imperative  does  not  take  the  form  of  supplying  a  further 
reason (e.g. that you will hate yourself, or that it is your purpose to 
do your duty). Rather, the categorical imperative tells us that con- 
siderations  like  “I  promised”  and  “it’s  his”  are  themselves  to  be 
treated as final and sufficient reasons.   
  But I believe this does not bring out the full force of the 
difference between Hume and Kant’s views. For Hume’s view that it 
is natural to be motivated by benevolence but not by agreement rests 
not only on a faulty conception of  action, but on the faulty con- 
ception of interaction that results. In order to explain this point, I turn 
to Kant’s account of interaction. 
  As I have tried to explain, Kant does not conceive of action 
merely as  a movement caused by something in the agent – say a 
desire – but rather as a movement determined by the adoption of a 
principle by the  agent. And accordingly, he does not  conceive of 
interaction merely as the production of effects by two agents on each 
other, not even as the mutually deliberate production of such effects.    28 
Instead, he conceives of interaction as shared or joint action – as a 
set of movements that is determined by a jointly adopted principle.  
On Kant’s account, people who interact must act together in a literal 
way – by deliberating together to arrive at a shared maxim that will 
then govern their conduct towards each other.   
  This shows up most clearly in Kant’s treatment of exactly 
the cases we have been talking about – the cases of promising and 
property – in the Metaphysical Principles of Justice. Kant’s theory 
assimilates  these  two  cases,  for  Kant  conceives  all  rights  on  the 
model of property rights, and that means that he supposes that when 
we make someone a promise what we are doing is in effect giving 
that person a kind of property right in an act of our own. To make a 
promise is to transfer your right over your choice whether to perform 
the action in question to the other person. Your action, or at least 
your choice whether to perform it, now belongs to the other and the 
other can claim it. So if I promise you that I will meet you for lunch 
tomorrow, a certain act of my will – the decision whether to meet 
you for lunch – now belongs to you and not to me. That is why it is 
you and only you who can release me from my promise – because 
the choice in fact belongs to you.   
But there is  a problem, Kant claims,  about how  this can 
happen. Suppose I offer you a promise. Until you accept my promise, 
I  can  always  take  it  back  –  I  am  not  committed  until  you  have 
accepted. But if in making my offer I have not yet committed myself, 
then I have not yet promised, and you have nothing to accept. If a 
promise consisted of two separate acts, this problem would be in- 
soluble, for there is necessarily a temporal gap between my offer and 
your  acceptance,  and  however  small  the  gap  is  it  prevents  the 
transaction from happening. The same problem exists and is even 
more vivid when what is happening between us is a transfer of an 
ordinary piece of property rather than of an act of my will.  How do I 
transfer my property to you? It cannot be that I first abandon my 
property and then you pick it up, for if I abandoned it then during the 
interval anyone could legitimately pick it up – it would be unowned 
property, which anyone may claim. Yet until I have abandoned it, it 
is mine, so how can it possibly become yours? If you take it when 
it’s mine you’ll be stealing it. The gap between the two acts again 
prevents the transfer. These problems show that promises and trans- 
fers  cannot  be  understood  as  the  result  of  two  separate  and 
successive acts. Instead they must involve the formation of a single   29 
common will, that is, the adoption of a shared principle or maxim.  
You agree to take what I agree to relinquish, I agree to relinquish 
what you agree to take, and so we form a unified will that the thing 
in question should be yours and not mine: it all has to happen at once, 
as a single action, if it is to happen at all.
34 The free choice of this 
maxim is an act that constitutes our unified will and makes shared 
action, and so interaction, possible.
35 
Now  in  one  way  this  account  makes  it  look  as  if  our 
motives for keeping our agreements are natural. At least, it looks as 
if, once we regard interaction in the way that Kant suggests, our 
reasons for keeping our agreements are no more mysterious (or per- 
haps I should say no less mysterious) than our reasons for carrying 
out any of our own choices, whether we make them alone or along 
with others. If we regard interaction as shared action, we don’t need 
a special reason for keeping our agreements, any more than we need 
a special reason for doing the things we’ve decided to do. But why 
should we regard interaction in this way? 
  The answer – or at least the part of the answer I am going to 
discuss in this paper –  is  that  it  is required by  the  conception of 
others as ends in themselves. To regard another as an end in himself 
is  to  regard  him  as  a  source  of  reasons,  and  this  conception  is 
expressed  in  the  fact  that,  when  you  deliberate  about  matters  by 
which you will be jointly affected, you take his reasons as well as 
your own into account. By “his reasons,” here, I do not mean the 
things you take to be good for him, but rather the things that he takes 
to be reasons. And to explain what I mean by “take into account,” I 
will make a comparison. Your own incentives appear in your private 
deliberations as candidates for reasons, and you deliberate by asking 
whether acting in a certain way on a certain incentive could serve as 
a law for you. When you and I engage in a shared deliberation, the 
reasons  endorsed by each of us play  the role of  incentives in  the 
shared deliberation; we ask together whether the maxim of acting on 
these reasons could serve as a law for us. When you act on a maxim 
that the two of us cannot possibly share – as you certainly do when 
you unilaterally set aside a principle that we have adopted together – 
you disregard my reasons, and so treat me as if I were not an end in 
itself, but merely a tool, or perhaps an obstacle, to ends of your own.  
So the conception of human beings as ends in themselves requires us 
to view interactions as shared actions.   30 
  The duty of beneficence springs from the same conception 
of others. Another person is a standing source of reasons, reasons 
that you cannot just ignore. On a given occasion, your own reasons 
may outweigh the other person’s, which is part of the reason why the 
duty is normally imperfect. But the reason you help him is not just 
that you want to:  it is that his reasons constitute claims on you in the 
same way as your own.
36   
 
8.  Conclusion 
   
I conclude that there is a sense in which it is just as natural 
to be motivated by agreement as it is by benevolence. That sense is 
given by the fact that respect for the law, and respect for humanity, 
are  for  Kant  one  and  the  same  thing.  According  to  Kant,  to  be 
motivated by the motive of duty, ultimately, is simply to be moti- 
vated by the other person himself, by the sheer normative fact of the 
other person himself. He’s there, he’s a source of reasons, a fellow 
deliberator and a standing source of claims. And in one way, Hume 
agrees with this. For Hume’s moral sense is not just the voice of our 
private  approvals  and  disapprovals.  Because  of  sympathy,  and  its 
universalizing effects, it the voice of humanity itself, internalized in 
each of us. And when it regulates our conduct, we are in a sense 
there for each other, present to each other, making normative claims.  
But  although  Hume’s  moral  theory  allows  us  in  this  way  to  be 
influenced by  the  claims of others, his theory of action  leaves us 
fundamentally divided from one another.
37 For a Humean agent is 
just a cause, like any other. On Hume’s conception of action, we 
cannot literally act together, we can only have effects on one another.  
It is not surprising that someone with this conception of action finds 
benevolence more intelligible than agreement as a source of moti- 
vation. 
  Kant’s conception of action allows us to deliberate and act 
together  in  a  deeper  way.  The  other  person  literally  occupies  the 
space of reasons with us, engages with us in deliberation that leads to 
actions that we carry out together. So when you do something just 
because of the other person, just because he is there, because he is a 
law to you just as you are to yourself, is your motivation natural or 
moral? The answer is simple:  it is moral – you are acting from the 
motive of duty – but it is also the most natural thing in the world.
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1. References to Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (2nd edition ed. L. 
A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), will 
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of such exceptions.  In the same place he asserts that his view differs from that of 
“the  schools”  because  he  admits  internal  perfect  duties  (G  4:421n.)  In  the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he classifies certain duties of virtue owed to the self as 
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120–121. 
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Later, he switched to the view that an action always involves a principle, but 
some actions are chosen under the wrong principle. I discuss this below in 
the text. For further discussion of the view that action is essentially auto- 
nomous  see  Korsgaard,  Self-Constitution,  chapters  4–5;  for  further  dis- 
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some sort of individual act of the mind (T 516). It is almost as if he thinks that 
the very fact that promising is essentially relational renders it unnatural.   36 
38.  An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  written  as  a  keynote 
lecture for the meetings of the Hume Society Meeting in Tokyo in 2004. I 
am grateful to the Hume Society for inviting me to speak. The paper itself 
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